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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Kathleen Fitzgerald appeals from the dismissal 
of her complaint against Kenneth S. Apfel, the 
Commissioner of Social Security, by the district court. The 
district court held that: it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over her claim for benefits; interim benefits were not 
authorized by statute; and Fitzgerald's due process claim 
failed on the merits. On appeal, Fitzgerald argues that the 
district court erred in concluding that interim benefits are 
unavailable and that her due process claim failed to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Because we 
find that the district court did not have jurisdiction over 
Fitzgerald's claim for interim benefits, we will affirm the 
dismissal of her complaint.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Fitzgerald did not raise the issue on appeal, we note that the 
district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over her 
claim for disability benefits for the same reasons as it lacked 
jurisdiction 
over her claim for interim benefits, as will be discussed infra. 
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I. 
 
Kathleen Fitzgerald applied for supplemental social 
security income and disability insurance benefits on July 
16, 1993, and August 31, 1993, respectively. Fitzgerald's 
claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. 
Fitzgerald filed a timely request for a hearing on October 
24, 1994. 
 
A hearing was held before an administrative law judge 
("ALJ") on July 18, 1995. The ALJ issued a decision on 
March 18, 1996, finding that Fitzgerald was not disabled. 
On March 20, 1996, Fitzgerald requested review from the 
Appeals Council. In her letter to the Appeals Council, 
counsel requested that "this claim be treated as one 
involving CRITICAL NEED and that the matter raised below 
be considered as expeditiously as possible." (App. at 8). 
Counsel did not elaborate on this request. 
 
On November 29, 1996, Fitzgerald's counsel sent another 
letter to the Appeals Council, stating that "[m]y client 
Kathleen Fitzgerald is in desperate financial need. I 
requested review on her behalf more than eight months 
ago. I have heard nothing from you about the matter." (App. 
at 10). Having not heard from the Appeals Council, 
Fitzgerald began the present action on April 16, 1997.2 
 
In her complaint, Fitzgerald alleged that she was disabled 
and entitled to disability insurance benefits and 
supplemental security income. She further alleged that she 
was in dire financial straits due to the extensive delay in 
deciding her application. Fitzgerald claimed that the failure 
of the Appeals Council to rule on her request for more than 
a year, despite the fact that she had informed them that 
she was destitute, constituted a constructive denial of her 
claim. She further alleged that the unreasonable delay 
violated her Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment 
and the Social Security Act. Fitzgerald requested as relief: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On June 27, 1997, the Appeals Council remanded Fitzgerald's 
application to the ALJ for further proceedings. A hearing was held on 
November 14, 1997. Fitzgerald's application was again denied on 
February 2, 1998. Counsel requested review by the Appeals Council on 
February 4, 1998. That request is still pending. 
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that the district court find that she was entitled to the 
benefits sought; interim benefits during the pendency of 
any further proceedings; and "such other relief as the court 
finds just and proper." (App. at 7). Fitzgerald filed a motion 
requesting interim benefits on May 2, 1997. 
 
On July 24, 1997, the district court issued an order 
denying the motion for interim benefits. See Fitzgerald v. 
Callahan, No. Civ. A. 97-2508, 1997 WL 438483 (E.D. Pa. 
July 24, 1997). The district court held that interim benefits 
were not provided for by statute and that it lacked the 
equitable power to grant them. The court also dismissed 
Fitzgerald's claim for benefits for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, since she failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies. Finally, the court found that Fitzgerald's due 
process claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, Fitzgerald argues that the district court erred 
in determining that interim benefits were not available and 
that her due process claim failed as a matter of law. She 
apparently concedes that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over her claim of entitlement to final benefits. 
Because we find that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to consider the availability of interim benefits, we need not 
decide whether such benefits are precluded by statute. 
 
Jurisdiction over Social Security benefits cases is 
provided by 42 U.S.C. S 405(g), which provides, in relevant 
part: "[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . 
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . ." 
Ordinarily, judicial review is barred absent a "final decision" 
by the Commissioner of Social Security. Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976). 
 
A final decision is "central to the requisite grant of 
subject matter jurisdiction." Id. The Supreme Court has 
stated that the "final decision" requirement 
 
       consists of two elements, only one of which is purely 
       "jurisdictional" in the sense that it cannot be waived by 
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       the Secretary in a particular case. The waivable 
       element is the requirement that the administrative 
       remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted. 
       The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a 
       claim for benefits shall have been presented to the 
       Secretary. 
 
Id. 
 
If a plaintiff 's claim is collateral to her claim for benefits, 
exhaustion may be waived under certain circumstances. 
See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986). 
"A claim is collateral if it is not essentially a claim for 
benefits." Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 
1993) (citing Bowen, supra). 
 
The district court lacked jurisdiction over Fitzgerald's 
claim for interim benefits both because she failed to present 
a demand for such benefits to the Commissioner and 
because her claim is not collateral to a claim for benefits. 
As to the former point, there is no indication in the record 
that Fitzgerald ever requested interim benefits from the 
Social Security Administration pending the outcome of the 
proceedings. Although she presented a general claim of 
disability, she did not address her claim of entitlement to 
interim benefits due to the excessive delay to the 
Commissioner. The failure to raise such a claim violates the 
nonwaivable jurisdictional aspect of exhaustion and is fatal 
to her claim. 
 
Furthermore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over 
Fitzgerald's claim for interim benefits because such a 
demand is not collateral to her claim for final benefits. 
Whether predicated on S 405(g) or on the due process 
clause, it is beyond cavil that interim benefits are linked to 
disability benefits. First, they are two forms of the same 
entitlement. More importantly, Fitzgerald's claim to interim 
benefits is linked to her entitlement to final benefits. 
Indeed, Fitzgerald repeatedly emphasized in her briefs and 
at argument that she was entitled to such benefits not just 
because of the extensive delay, but also because of her 
indigency and the merits of her case. Cf. Bush v. Shalala, 
94 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1996) ("absent a finding that the 
claimant was actually disabled, delay alone is an 
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insufficient basis on which to remand for benefits;" 
discussing Kelly v. Railroad Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 491 (3d 
Cir. 1980)). Since we are unable to separate the merits of 
her claim for interim benefits from her claim forfinal 
disability benefits, the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear her claim for interim benefits absent a final decision 
by the Commissioner. Her motion was thus properly denied.3 
Because we have determined that the federal courts lack 
jurisdiction to consider Fitzgerald's interim benefits claim, 
we need not decide whether such benefits are available 
under the Social Security statutory regime. 
 
The district court may well have had jurisdiction over 
Fitzgerald's due process claim to the extent that she sought 
some other form of relief. In her complaint, Fitzgerald 
added a general request for "such other relief as the court 
finds just and proper" to her demands for final and interim 
benefits. We do not understand her to be asking for other 
equitable remedies such as injunctive relief mandating that 
the SSA promptly decide her application. No such request 
appeared in either her complaint or her appellate briefs. 
Counsel did indicate at argument that to the extent the 
Court denied Fitzgerald the relief that she sought, she 
would welcome some other form of equitable relief. 
Nevertheless, even if such a claim had been properly raised 
to the Court, it would be inappropriate in the present case. 
Although Fitzgerald's request for review by the Appeals 
Council had been pending for thirteen months at the time 
she filed the instant action, the Appeals Council 
subsequently ordered a remand to the ALJ. The ALJ 
rendered an unfavorable decision on February 4, 1998, and 
Fitzgerald's request for review is currently before the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that in those cases where the court discussed the availability 
and appropriateness of interim benefits in initial determination cases, 
the court had jurisdiction under S 405(g) because, unlike the instant 
appeal, the Commissioner had rendered a final decision. See, e.g. 
Doughty v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1988); Taylor v. Heckler, 769 
F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1985); Saltares v. Bowen, 711 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989); Davenport v. Bowen, 709 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Mason- 
Page v. Bowen, 655 F. Supp. 255 (D.N.J. 1987); Weiser v. Secretary, 
HHS, 645 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dandeneau v. Heckler, 607 F. 
Supp. 583 (D. Me. 1985). 
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Appeals Council. Under this factual scenario, individualized 
injunctive relief is unwarranted. 
 
III. 
 
We have considered Fitzgerald's arguments and we 
conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider her request for interim benefits. Because 
Fitzgerald's application is currently proceeding in a 
relatively timely manner before the Social Security 
Administration, other forms of injunctive relief are 
inappropriate. The judgment of the district court is 
therefore affirmed.4 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because we have limited our discussion to the jurisdictional aspects 
of this action, nothing in this opinion should be construed as expressing 
a view as to the merits of Fitzgerald's disability claim, or as to the 
availability of interim benefits in an appropriate case when the district 
court properly has jurisdiction. 
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